A model of stochastic games where multiple controllers jointly control the evolution of the state of a dynamic system but have access to different information about the state and action processes is considered. The asymmetry of information among the controllers makes it difficult to compute or characterize Nash equilibria. Using common information among the controllers, the game with asymmetric information is shown to be equivalent to another game with symmetric information. Further, under certain conditions, a Markov state is identified for the equivalent symmetric information game and its Markov perfect equilibria are characterized. This characterization provides a backward induction algorithm to find Nash equilibria of the original game with asymmetric information in pure or behavioral strategies. Each step of this algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one-stage Bayesian game. The class of Nash equilibria of the original game that can be characterized in this backward manner are named common information based Markov perfect equilibria.
asymmetric information games that are amenable to such a decomposition. The basic conceptual observation underlying our results is the following: the essential impediment to applying backward induction in asymmetric information games is the fact that a player's posterior beliefs about the system state and about other players' information may depend on the strategies used by the players in the past. If the nature of system dynamics and the information structure of the game ensures that the players' posterior beliefs are strategy independent, then a backward induction argument is feasible. We formalize this conceptual argument in this paper.
We first use the common information among the controllers to show that the game with asymmetric information is equivalent to another game with symmetric information. Further, under the assumption of strategy independence of posterior beliefs, we identify a Markov state for the equivalent symmetric information game and characterize its Markov perfect equilibria using backward induction arguments. This characterization provides a backward induction algorithm to find Nash equilibria of the original game with asymmetric information. Each step of this algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one-stage Bayesian game. The class of Nash equilibria of the original game that can be characterized in this backward manner are named common information based Markov perfect equilibria. For notational convenience, we consider games with only two controllers. Our results extend to games with n > 2 controllers in a straightforward manner.
Our work is conceptually similar to the work in [16] . The authors in [16] considered a model of finite stochastic game with discounted infinite-horizon cost function where each player has a privately observed state. Under the assumption that player i's belief about other players' states depends only the current state of player i and does not depend on player i's strategy, [16] presented a recursive algorithm to compute Nash equilibrium. Both our model and our main assumptions differ from those in [16] . expectation of a random variable. For a collection of functions g, P g (·) and E g (·) denote that the probability/expectation depends on the choice of functions in g. Similarly, for a probability distribution π, E π (·) denotes that the expectation is with respect to the distribution π. The notation 1 {a=b} denotes 1 if the equality in the subscript is true and 0 otherwise. For a finite set A, ∆(A)
A. Notation
is the set of all probability mass functions over A. For two random variables (or random vectors)
X and Y , P(X = x|Y ) denotes the conditional probability of the event {X = x} given Y . This is a random variable whose realization depends on the realization of Y .
When dealing with collections of random variables, we will at times treat the collection as a random vector of appropriate dimension. At other times, it will be convenient to think of different collections of random variables as sets on which one can define the usual set operations. For example consider random vectors A = (A 1 , A 2 , A 3 ) andÃ = (A 1 , A 2 ). Then, treating A andÃ as sets would allow us to write A \Ã = {A 3 }.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We present our model of a stochastic game with asymmetric information in Section II. We present several special cases of our model in Section III. We prove our main results in Section IV. We extend our arguments to consider behavioral strategies in Section V. We examine the importance of our assumptions in Section VI.
Finally, we conclude in Section VII.
II. THE BASIC GAME G1

A. The Primitive Random Variables and the Dynamic System
We consider a collection of finitely-valued, mutually independent random vectors (X 1 , W T ) with known probability mass functions. These random variables are called the primitive random variables.
Remark 1
The system dynamics and the observation model (that is, the functions f t , h 1 t , h 2 t in (1) and (2) ), the statistics of the primitive random variables, the information structure of the game and the cost functions are assumed to be common knowledge among the controllers. ✷
C. Evolution of Common and Private Information
Assumption 1 We assume that the common and private information evolve over time as follows:
1) The common information C t is increasing with time, that is, C t ⊂ C t+1 for all t. Let Z t+1 = C t+1 \ C t be the increment in common information from time t to t + 1. Thus,
where ζ t+1 is a fixed transformation.
2) The private information evolves according to the equation
where ξ i t+1 , i = 1, 2, are fixed transformations.
Equation (6) states that the increment in common information is a function of the "new"
variables generated between t and t + 1, that is, the actions taken at t and the observations made at t + 1, and the "old" variables that were part of private information at time t. Equation (7) implies that the evolution of private information at the two controllers is influenced by different observations and actions.
D. Common Information Based Conditional Beliefs
A key concept in our analysis is the belief about the state and the private informations conditioned on the common information of both controllers. Formally, at any time t, given the control laws from time 1 to t − 1, we define the common information based conditional belief as follows:
where we use the superscript g 1 1:t−1 , g 2 1:t−1 in the RHS of (8) to emphasize that the conditional belief depends on the past control laws. Note that 
These partial functions are functions from the private information of a controller to its control action. These are random functions whose realizations depend on the realization of the random vector C t . The following lemma describes the evolution of the common information based conditional belief using these partial functions.
Lemma 1
Consider any choice of control laws g 
where F t is a fixed transformation that does not depend on the control strategies.
✷
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 1 states that the evolution of the conditional belief Π t is governed by the partial functions of control laws at time t. This lemma relies on Assumption 1 made earlier about the evolution of common and private information. We now introduce the following critical assumption that eliminates the dependence of Π t on the control laws. 
for all x t , p Equivalently, the evolution of the common information based conditional belief described in Lemma 1 depends only on the increment in common information, that is, (9) can be written as
Remark 2 Assumption 2 is somewhat related to the notion of one-way separation in stochastic control, that is, the estimation (of the state in standard stochastic control and of the state and private information in Assumption 2) is independent of the control strategy.
III. GAMES SATISFYING ASSUMPTIONS 1 AND 2
Before proceeding with further analysis, we first describe some instances of G1 where the nature of the dynamic system and the private and common information implies that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
A. One-Step Delayed Information Sharing Pattern
Consider the instance of G1 where the common information at any time t is given as C t = 
{Y
This information structure can be interpreted as the case where all observations and actions are shared among controllers with one step delay.
Lemma 2
The game with one-step delayed sharing information pattern described above satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. A special case of the above information structure is the situation where the state
A game with this information structure was considered in [13] . It is interesting to note that Assumption 2 is not true if information is shared with delays larger than one time step [17] . 1 Appendices F-J are included in the Supplementary Material section at the end of the paper.
B. Information Sharing with One-Directional-One-Step Delay
Similar to the one-step delay case, we consider the situation where all observations of controller 1 are available to controller 2 with no delay while the observations of controller 2 are available to controller 1 with one-step delay. All past control actions are available to both controllers.
That is, in this case, 
Assume that the information structure is given as:
That is, controller 1's observations are available to controller 2 instantly while controller 2's observations are available to controller 1 with a delay of d ≥ 1 time steps.
Case B: Similar to the above case, consider the situation where the state dynamics are still controlled only by controller 1 but the information structure is: 
Lemma 4 The games described in Cases
D. An Information Structure with Global and Local States
Noiseless Observations: We now consider the information structure described in [18] . In this example, the state X t has three components: a global state X 0 t and a local state X i t for each controller. The state evolution is given by the following equation:
Note that the dynamics depend on the current global state X 0 t but not on the current local states. Each controller has access to the global state process X 0 1:t and its current local state X i t . In addition, each controller knows the past actions of all controllers. Thus, the common and private information in this case are:
It is straightforward to verify that Assumption 1 holds for this case.
For a realization {x 
It is easy to verify that the above belief depends only on the statistics of W 0 t−1 and is therefore independent of control laws. Thus, Assumption 2 also holds for this case.
Noisy Observations: We can also consider a modification of the above scenario where both controllers have a common, noisy observation
Lemma 5
The game with the information pattern described above satisfies Assumptions 1 and
2.
✷ Proof: See Appendix I.
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E. Uncontrolled State Process
Consider a state process whose evolution does not depend on the control actions, that is, the system state evolves as
Further, the common and private information evolve as follows:
where ξ i t+1 , i = 1, 2, are fixed transformations. Note that while control actions do not affect the state evolution, they still affect the costs.
Lemma 6
The game G1 with an uncontrolled state process described above satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2. As an example of this case, consider the information structure where the two controllers share their observations about an uncontrolled state process with a delay of d ≥ 1 time steps. In this case, the common information is C t = {Y 
F. Symmetric Information Game
Consider the case when all observations and actions are available to both controllers, that is, ). π t is the same as the information state in centralized stochastic control, which is known to be control strategy independent and which satisfies an update equation of the form required in Assumption 2 [19] . A related case with perfect state observations is the situation where 
IV. MAIN RESULTS
Our goal in this section is to show that under Assumptions 1 and 2, a class of equilibria of the game G1 can be characterized in a backward inductive manner that resembles the backward inductive characterization of Markov perfect equilibria of symmetric information games with perfect state observation. However, in order to do so, we have to view our asymmetric information game as a symmetric information game by introducing "virtual players" that make decisions based on the common information. This section describes this change of perspective and how it can be used to characterize a class of Nash equilibria.
We reconsider the model of game G1. We assume that controller i is replaced by a virtual player i (VP i). The system operates as follows: At time t, the data available to each virtual player is the common information C t . The virtual player i selects a function
Note that under a given decision rule χ
t is a random function since C t is a random vector. We will use γ i t to denote a realization of Γ i t . We will refer to Γ i t as the prescription selected by virtual player i at time t. Once the virtual player has chosen Γ i t , a control action
is called the strategy of the virtual player i. The total cost of the virtual player i is given as
where the expectation on the right hand side of (16) is with respect to the probability measure on the state and action processes induced by the choice of strategies χ 1 , χ 2 on the left hand side of (16) . We refer to the game among the virtual players as game G2.
Remark 3
In case there is no private information, the function Γ 
for each possible realization c t of common information at time t.
is a Nash equilibrium of game G2, then define
for each possible realization c t of common information at time t. Then (g 1 , g 2 ) is a Nash equilibrium of game G1.
✷
Proof: It is clear that using (17) , any controller strategy profile in game G1 can be transformed to a corresponding virtual player strategy profile in game G2 without altering the behavior of the dynamic system and in particular the values of the expected costs. If a virtual player can reduce its costs by unilaterally deviating from χ i , then such a deviation must also exist for the corresponding controller in G1. Therefore, equilibrium of controllers' strategies implies equilibrium of corresponding virtual players' strategies. The converse can be shown using similar arguments.
The game between the virtual players is a symmetric information game since they both make their decisions based only on the common information C t . In the next section, we identify a Markov state for this symmetric information game and characterize Markov perfect equilibria for this game.
B. Markov Perfect Equilibrium of G2
We want to establish that the common information based conditional beliefs Π t (defined in (8)) can serve as a Markov state for the game G2. Firstly, note that because of Assumption 2, Π t depends only on the common information C t and since both the virtual players know the common information, the belief Π t is common knowledge among them. The following lemma
shows that Π t evolves as a controlled Markov process.
Lemma 7 From the virtual players' perspective, the process
Π t , t = 1, 2, . . . ,
T is a controlled
Markov process with the virtual players' prescriptions γ
. , T as the controlling actions, that is,
Proof: See Appendix B.
Following the development in [20] , we next show that if one virtual player is using a strategy that is measurable with respect to Π t , then the other virtual player can select an optimal response strategy measurable with respect to Π t as well.
Lemma 8 If virtual player i is using a decision strategy that selects prescriptions only as a function of the belief Π t , that is,
Γ i t = ψ i t (Π t ), t = 1, . . .
, T, then virtual player j can also choose its prescriptions only as a function of the belief Π t without any loss of performance.
✷ Proof: See Appendix C Lemmas 7 and 8 establish Π t as the Markov state for the game G2. We now define a Markov perfect equilibrium for game G2.
Definition 1 A strategy profile (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) is said to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 if (i) at each time t, the strategies select prescriptions only as a function of the common information based belief Π t and (ii) the strategies form a Nash equilibrium for every sub-game of G2 [3] . Given a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2, we can construct a corresponding Nash equilibrium of game G1 using Theorem 1. We refer to the class of Nash equilibria of G1 that can be constructed from the Markov perfect equilibria of G2 as the common information based Markov perfect equilibria of G1.
, is called a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for game G1 if the corresponding strategies of game G2 defined as
form a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2.
✷
The following theorem provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2.
Theorem 2 Consider a strategy pair
(ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) such
that at each time t, the strategies select prescriptions based only on the realization of the common information based belief π t , that is,
A necessary and sufficient condition for (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) to be a Markov perfect equilibrium of G2 is that they satisfy the following conditions:
For each possible realization π of Π T , define the value function for virtual player 1:
Similarly, define the value function for virtual player 2:
2) For t = T − 1, . . . , 1 and for each possible realization π of Π t , define recursively the value functions for virtual player 1:
Similarly, define recursively the value functions for virtual player 2:
where
Theorem 2 suggest that one could follow a backward inductive procedure to find equilibrium strategies for the virtual players. Before describing this backward procedure in detail, we make a simple but useful observation. In (20)- (23), since theγ i enters the expectation only asγ
it suggests that we may be able to carry out the minimization overγ i by separately minimizing overγ i (p i ) for all possible p i . This observation leads us to the backward induction procedure described in the next section.
Remark 4
Note that if Assumption 2 were not true, then according to Lemma 1,
In this case, the entire prescriptionγ i will affect the second term in the expectation in (22)- (23), and we could not hope to carry out the minimization overγ i by separately minimizing overγ i (p i ) for all possible p i .
✷
C. Backward Induction Algorithm for Finding Equilibrium
We can now describe a backward inductive procedure to find a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 using a sequence of one-stage Bayesian games. We proceed as follows:
1) At the terminal time T , for each realization π of the common information based belief at time T , we define a one-stage Bayesian game SG T (π) where a) The probability distribution on (X T , P
2 Agent i can be thought to be the same as controller i. We use a different name here in order to maintain the distinction between games G1 and SGT (π).
A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ i , i = 1, 2, for the agents which map their observation
is a solution of the minimization problem
where j = i and the superscript π denotes that the expectation is with respect to the distribution π. (See [21] , [22] for a definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium.) If a Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ 1 * , γ 2 * of SG T (π) exists, denote the corresponding expected equilibrium
2) At time t < T , for each realization π of the common information based belief at time t,
we define the one-stage Bayesian game SG t (π) where a) The probability distribution on (X t , P
Recall that the belief for the next time step is Π t+1 = F t (π, Z t+1 ) and Z t+1 is given by (6) . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ i , i = 1, 2, for the agents which map their observation P i t to their action U i t such that for any realization p i ,
where j = i, i, j = 1, 2, and Z t+1 is the increment in common information generated according to (6) , (2) and (1) 
D. An Example Illustrating Algorithm 1
We consider an example of game G1 where the (scalar) state X t and the (scalar) control
t take value in the set {0, 1}. The state evolves as a controlled Markov chain depending on the two control actions according to the state transition probabilities:
The initial state is assumed to be equi-probable, i.e., P {X 1 = 0} = P {X 1 = 1} = 1/2. The first controller observes the state perfectly, while the second controller observes the state through a binary symmetric channel with probability of error 1/3. Thus,
, 1 − X t with probability 1 3 .
The controllers share the observations and actions with a delay of one time step. Thus, the common information and private informations at time step t are given as
In the equivalent game with virtual players, the decision of the i th virtual player, Γ 
The above equation implies that the distribution π t is completely specified by x t−1 , u 
Applying Algorithm 1:
We now use Algorithm 1 for a two-stage version of the game described above. , given by the matrices defined above. A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ 1 , γ 2 , such that
It is easy to verify that
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of SG 2 (π). The expected equilibrium cost for agent i is
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2) At time t = 1, since there is no common information, the common information based belief π 1 is simply the prior belief on (X 1
We define the one-stage Bayesian game SG 1 (π 1 ) where a) The probability distribution on (X 1 A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies δ 1 , δ 2 such that
• For y = 0, 1, δ 2 (y) is a solution of
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of SG 1 (π). The expected equilibrium costs are Since we now know the equilibrium decision rules ψ i t , i = 1, 2, t = 1, 2 for the virtual players, we can construct the corresponding control laws for the controllers using Theorem 3. Thus, a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium for the game in this example is given by the strategies: 
V. BEHAVIORAL STRATEGIES AND EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM
The results of Theorems 2 and 3 provide sufficient conditions for a pair of strategies to be an equilibrium of game G2. Neither of these results addresses the question of existence of equilibrium. In particular, the result of Theorem 3 states that the (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibria of the one-stage Bayesian games SG t (π), t = T, . . . , 1, may be used to find a Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 and hence a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium of G1. However, the games SG t (π) may not have any (pure strategy) Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
As is common in finite games, we need to allow for behavioral strategies in order to ensure the existence of equilibria. Toward that end, we now reconsider the model of game G1. At each time t, each controller is now allowed to select a probability distribution D i t over the (finite) set of actions U i t , i = 1, 2 according to a control law of the form:
The rest of the model is the same as in Section II. We denote the set of probability distributions over U . A mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ 1 , γ 2 such that for any realization p i , γ i (p i ) assigns zero probability to any action that is not a solution of the minimization problem
where U j t is distributed according to γ j (P j t ). Since SG t (π) is a finite Bayesian game, a mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [22] . For any mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium γ 1 * , γ 2 * of SG T (π), denote the expected equilibrium costs as V i T (π) and define ψ i t (π) := γ i * , i = 1, 2.
2) At time t < T , for each realization π of the common information based belief at time t, consider the one-stage Bayesian game SG t (π) defined in Algorithm 1. A mixed strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game is a pair of strategies γ 1 , γ 2 such that for any realization p i , γ i (p i ) assigns zero probability to any action that is not a solution of the minimization problem
where U j t is distributed according to γ j (P j t ) and Z t+1 is the increment in common information generated according to (6) , (2) and (1) 
A. Importance of Assumption 2
The most restrictive assumption in our analysis of game G1 is Assumption 2 which states that the common information based belief is independent of control strategies. It is instructive to consider why our analysis does not work in the absence of this assumption. Let us consider the model of Section II with Assumption 1 as before but without Assumption 2. Lemma 1, which follows from Assumption 1, is still true. For this version of game G1 without Assumption 2, we can construct an equivalent game with virtual players similar to game G2. Further, it is easy to show that Theorem 1 which relates equilibria of G2 to those of G1 is still true.
The key result for our analysis of game G2 in section IV was Lemma 8 which allowed us to use π t as a Markov state and to define and characterize Markov perfect equilibria for the game G2. Lemma 8 essentially states that the set of Markov decision strategy pairs (that is, strategies that select prescriptions as a function of π t ) is closed with respect to the best response mapping.
In other words, if we start with any pair of Markov strategies (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) for the virtual players and define χ i to be the best response of virtual player i to ψ j , then, for at least one choice of best response strategies, the pair (χ 1 , χ 2 ) belongs to the set of Markov strategy pairs. This is true not just for strategies (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) that form an equilibrium but for any choice of Markov strategies.
We will now argue that this is not necessarily true without Assumption 2.
Recall that due to Lemma 1, the belief π t evolves as
May 2, 2014 DRAFT Thus, in order to evaluate the current realization of π t , a virtual player must know the prescriptions used by both virtual players. However, the virtual players do not observe each other's past prescriptions since the only data they have available is c t . Thus, a virtual player cannot evaluate the belief π t without knowing (or assuming) how the other player selects its prescriptions.
Consider now decision strategies (ψ 1 , ψ 2 ) for the two virtual players which operate as follows:
At each time t, the prescriptions chosen by virtual players are
and the belief at the next time t + 1 is
Assume that the above strategies are not a Nash equilibrium for the virtual players' game.
Therefore, one virtual player, say virtual player 2, can benefit by deviating from its strategy.
Given that virtual player 1 continues to operate according to (29) and (30), is it possible for virtual player 2 to reduce its cost by using a non-Markov strategy, that is, a strategy that selects prescriptions based on more data than just π t ? Consider any time t, if virtual player 2 has deviated to some other choice of Markov decision rules ψ 2 * 1:t−1 in the past, then the true belief on state and private information given the common information,
is different from the belief π t evaluated by the first player according to (30). (Note that since past prescriptions are not observed and virtual player 1's operation is fixed by (29) and (30), virtual player 1 continues to use π t evolving according to (30) as its belief.) Even though π t is no longer the true belief, virtual player 2 can still track its evolution using (30). Using arguments similar to those in the proofs of Lemmas 7 and 8, it can be established that an optimal strategy for virtual player 2, given that virtual player 1 operates according to (29) and (30), is of the
, where π * t is the true conditional belief on state and private information given the common information whereas π t is given by (30). Thus, the best response of player 2 may not necessarily be a Markov strategy and hence Lemma 8 may no longer hold. Without Lemma 8, we cannot define Markov perfect equilibrium of game G2 using π t as the state.
B. The Case of Team Problems
The game G1 is referred to as a team problem if the two controllers have the same cost functions, that is, c 1 (·) = c 2 (·) = c team (·). Nash equilibrium strategies can then be interpreted as person-by-person optimal strategies [23] . Clearly, the results of sections IV and V apply to person-by-person optimal strategies for team problems as well.
For team problems, our results can be strengthened in two ways. Firstly, we can find globally optimal strategies for the controllers in the team using the virtual player approach and secondly, we no longer need to make Assumption 2. Let us retrace our steps in section IV for the team problem without Assumption 2:
1) We can once again introduce virtual players that observe the common information and select prescriptions for the controllers. The two virtual players have the same cost function.
So game G2 is now a team problem and we will refer to it as T2 . It is straightforward to establish that globally optimal strategies for virtual player can be translated to globally optimal strategies for the controllers in the team in a manner identical to Theorem 1.
2) Since we are no longer making Assumption 2, the common information belief evolves according to
Virtual player 1 does not observe γ 2 t−1 , so it cannot carry out the update described in (31). However, we will now increase the information available to virtual players and assume that each virtual player can indeed observe all past prescriptions γ 1 1:t−1 , γ 2 1:t−1 . We refer to this team with expanded information for the virtual players as T2'.
It should be noted that the globally optimal expected cost for T2' can be no larger than the globally optimal cost of T2 since we have only added information in going from T2 to T2'. We will later show that the globally optimal strategies we find for T2' can be translated to equivalent strategies for T2 with the same expected cost.
3) For T2', since all past prescriptions are observed, both virtual players can evaluate π t using (31) without knowing the past decision rules ψ 
where (π) in the above dynamic program. The globally optimal virtual players' operation can be described as: At each t, evaluate
and then select the prescriptions
Now, instead of operating according to (34) and (35), assume that virtual players operate as follows: At each t, evaluate
It should be clear that virtual players operating according to (36) and (37) will achieve the same globally optimal performance as the virtual players operating according to (34) and (35). Furthermore, the virtual players in T2 can follow (36) and (37) and thus achieve the same globally optimal performance as in T2'.
Thus, to find globally optimal strategies for the team of virtual players in absence of Assumption 2, we first increased their information to include past prescriptions and then mapped the globally optimal strategies with increased information to equivalent strategies with original information.
For the game G2 in absence of assumption 2, we cannot follow the above approach of first increasing virtual players' information to include past prescriptions, finding equilibrium with added information and then mapping the equilibrium strategies to equivalent strategies with original information. To see the reason, let us denote the virtual player operation given by (34) and (35) by the strategy σ i , i = 1, 2 and the virtual player operation given by (36) and (37) by the
Therefore, the equilibrium conditions for σ 1 , σ 2 :
do not necessarily imply the equilibrium conditions forσ 1 ,σ 2 :
Remark 5 Our dynamic program for the team problem is similar to the dynamic program for teams obtained in [24] using a slightly different but conceptually similar approach.
✷
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We considered the problem of finding Nash equilibria of a general model of stochastic games with asymmetric information. Our analysis relied on the nature of common and private information among the controllers. Crucially, we assumed that the common information among controllers is increasing with time and that a common information based belief on the system state and private information is independent of control strategies. Under these assumptions, the game with asymmetric information is shown to be equivalent to another game with symmetric information for which we obtained a characterization of Markov perfect equilibria. This characterization allowed us to provide a backward induction algorithm to find Nash equilibria of the original game. Each step of this algorithm involves finding Bayesian Nash equilibria of a one- Further, for zero-sum games, the uniqueness of the value of the game implies that the equilibrium cost of a common information based Markov perfect equilibrium is the same as the equilibrium cost of any other Nash equilibrium [21] .
For finite games, it is always possible to find pure strategy Nash equilibria (if they exist) by a brute force search of the set of possible strategy profiles. The number of strategy choices for
For simplicity, assume that the set of possible realizations of private information P i t does not change with time. However, because the common information is required to be increasing with time (see Assumption 1), the cardinality of the set possible realization of common information C t is exponentially increasing with time. Thus, the number of possible control strategies exhibits a double exponential growth with time.
Algorithm 1 provides an alternative way for finding an equilibrium by solving a succession of one stage Bayesian games. But how many such games need to solved? At each time t, we need to solve a Bayesian game for each possible realization of the belief π t . Let R t denote the set of possible realizations of the belief π t . Since the belief is simply a function of the common information, we must have that |R t | ≤ |C t |. Thus, the total number of one stage games that need to solved is no larger that T t=1 |C t |. Recalling the exponential growth of |C t |, the number of one-stage games to solve shows an exponential growth with time. This is clearly better than the double exponential growth for the brute force search.
Two possible reasons may further reduce the complexity of Algorithm 1. Firstly, the set |R t | may not be growing exponentially with time (as in the case of the information structure in Section IV-D, where |R t | = 3, for all t > 1). Secondly, the one-stage games at time t, SG t (π) may possess enough structure that it is possible to find an equilibrium for a generic π that can be used to construct equilibrium for all choices of π. For finite games, it is not clear what additional features need to be present in game G1 such that the resulting one-stage games SG t (π) can be solved for a generic π. In the sequel to this paper we will extend the approach used here to linear quadratic Gaussian games and show that in these games it is possible to solve the one-stage games for a generic belief π.
Conceptually, the approach adopted in this paper can be extended to infinite time horizon games with discounted costs under suitable stationarity conditions. However, in infinite horizon games, the number of possible realizations of the common information based belief would, in general, be infinite. Establishing the existence of common information based Markov perfect equilibria for infinite horizon games would be an interesting direction for future work in this area. Consider a realization c t of the common information C t at time t. Let γ
, Z t+1 ) depends only on π t , γ 1 t and γ 2 t with no dependence on control strategies.
We can now consider the common information based belief at time t + 1,
The numerator and denominator of (41) are both marginals of the probability in (40). Using (40) in (41), gives π t+1 as a function of π t , γ Consider a realization c t of common information at time t and realizations π 1:t , γ 1 1:t , γ 2 1:t of beliefs and prescriptions till time t. Because of (10) in Assumption 2, we have
Hence, in order to establish the lemma, it suffices to show that
Recall that
where we used the fact that the control actions are simply the prescriptions evaluated at the private information. Therefore, of the common information at time t + 1, the common information based belief can be written
where we used the dynamics and observation model to get the expression in (50). It can now be argued that in the last term in (50), we can remove the terms u which is known to be independent of choice of control laws g Proof: It is straightforward to verify that the structure of common and private information satisfies Assumption 1. We focus on the proof for Assumption 2. For a realization y 
The numerator in the second term in (52) can be written as 
The first term in (55) depends only on the noise statistics. To see how the second term in (55) is strategy independent, consider a centralized stochastic control problem with controller 1 as the only controller where the state process isX t := (X t−d:t ), the observation process is
The second term in (55) is simply the information state P(X t |ỹ 1:t , u 1 1:t−1 ) of this centralized stochastic control problem which is known to be strategy independent and satisfies an update equation of the form required by Lemma 4 [19] .
Case B:
Using arguments similar to those in Case A, the common information based belief π t for a realization y 
The second term in (56) is P(y 
Both the numerator and the denominator can be shown to be strategy independent using the transformation to centralized stochastic control problem described in case A. 
The control strategy dependent term in the numerator in (59) can be written as 
Similarly, the control strategy dependent term in the denominator in (59) can be written as Consider a realization c t of the common information C t at time t. Given the realization of the common information based belief π t , we can find the joint conditional distribution on (X t , P 
Note that in addition to the arguments on the left side of conditioning in (62), we only need π t to evaluate the right hand side of (62).
The numerator and denominator of (63) are both marginals of the probability in (62). Using (62) in (63), gives π t+1 as a function of π t , z t+1 .
